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Abstract 
 
This paper tests three hypotheses concerning intra-household resource allocation in rural China. 
First, whether increasing the women's bargaining power alters household expenditure patterns. 
Second, whether households allocate fewer resources to daughters than to sons. Third, whether 
increasing the bargaining power of women reduces pro-boy discrimination. We find that 
expenditure patterns do vary with proxies for women's bargaining power. Pro-boy 
discrimination is suggested by: lower female outlay equivalent ratios for adult goods; greater 
sensitivity of household health spending to young boys than to young girls; and high male sex 
ratios. No evidence is found to support the third hypothesis.  
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1. Introduction 
 Econometric studies from various countries have tended to show that if men have more 
power in decisions over household expenditure, more goods are purchased for adults or men 
than for children and general family use. In the Côte d'Ivoire, men appear to spend a greater 
proportion of the income they earn on goods such as alcohol and cigarettes; by contrast, women 
are more likely to purchase goods for children and for general household consumption 
(Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995)1. The identity of the individual receiving non-wage income 
affects the pattern of household expenditure in Brazil (Thomas, 1993)2. Philipps and Burton 
(1993) find that Canadian men and women in full-time employment have differential spending 
patterns3. Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (1992) obtained similar findings for 
French households4.  
 As yet, there have been no comparable studies for China. The Chinese rural economy 
has experienced rapid growth since the commencement of reform in 1979. An increase in 
household income will not necessarily be equally distributed among all household members. For 
instance, children or aged members may not be decision-makers within the household, being 
instead dependent on others. Growth in household income may not benefit such dependants 
much if their needs are given low weight by household decision-makers. In the case of rural 
China, girls' education can be badly affected by the need to increase household labour. Aged 
members of households may be relatively deprived when they lose their capacity to work. 
However, the structure of power between men and women within the household may vary. 
Women can be expected to have a greater influence on household decision-making if their own 
income or education is high relative to that of men. 
 In this paper we study rural household expenditure patterns, paying special attention to 
gender issues. We examine the determinants of resource allocation within the household, 
focusing on the impact of the relative bargaining power of spouses on the welfare of different 
demographic groups defined by age and sex. How do gender differences in bargaining power 
affect the distribution of welfare within the household? The consequences for household outlays 
on education and medical care for girls are given special attention. 
 Our analysis is based on the data of a nationally representative household survey, 
covering 8000 rural households from 19 provinces. The purpose of the survey was to study 
income distribution in China5. The data were collected by the Institute of Economics, Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences in 1996, and related to 1995. 
 
2.  The setting 
 Until recently most economic research at the household level has been motivated by 
"unitary" household models (Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman, 1997)6. That is to say, the 
household has been modelled as maximising a single objective function. Contrary to what is 
sometimes claimed, this approach can be used to analyse intra-household allocation. Intra-
household inequality may be ascribed to compensating for or reinforcing responses to 
differences in individual member's productivity. Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) explained why 
"excess" female mortality in India was associated with low female labour market participation 
in terms of the reinforcement of productivity differences7. Alternatively, intra-household 
inequalities may reflect differences in the relative weights given to individuals' interests in the 
household objective function. For example, Behrman (1988) found "pro-son bias" in lean 
seasons in three Indian villages8. However, the unitary model provides a somewhat restricted 
perspective on intra-household inequality. In particular, it gives no role to inequalities in intra-
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household bargaining power in explaining intra-household inequalities in resource allocation. 
There is a given household objective function which is assumed to be impervious to factors that 
might be expected to alter the bargaining power of household members. For example, Folbre 
(1984) argued that an alternative explanation of Rosenzweig and Schultz's (1982) results was 
that higher female labour market participation raised the bargaining power of women and hence 
led to better treatment of girls. As Folbre argues: 
 "The suggestion that women and female children voluntarily relinquish leisure, 
education and food would be somewhat more persuasive if they were in a position to 
demand their fair share. It is the juxtaposition of women's lack of economic power with 
the unequal allocation of household resources that lends the bargaining power 
approach much of its persuasive appeal"9. 
 This richer view of intra-household allocation has been formalised in the class of 
"collective" household models. These recognise that household decisions are the result of 
interaction among members with sometimes divergent preferences. Collective models may be 
further distinguished, following the terminology of game theory, into cooperative and non-
cooperative variants. Under the former, binding agreements may be entered into and outcomes 
may be determined by bargaining processes. Under the latter, no binding agreements are 
possible and household members do the best they can give the actions of others. 
 In cooperative models, bargaining power depends in part on an individual's "fall-back" 
position, i.e., on what their welfare would be were cooperation to fail. There are various 
interpretations of what such "fall-back" positions would be in practice. They are commonly 
taken to be separation and the dissolution of the household. However, this may be rather 
extreme: for more mundane disagreements, the household may persist but perhaps act non-
cooperatively.   
 Over the century the Chinese rural economy has gone through a circle: from traditionally 
household-run farming to collectivized, commune-run farming, and back again to land-lease-
based, household farming. This historical regression shows the tenacious role Chinese 
households play in farm production. The Chinese rural household has typically been viewed as a 
close unit that ties its members together with bonds of kinship. Given such a strong family 
culture, a cooperative or unitary model has commonly been assumed in studying the behaviour 
of rural Chinese households.  
 Chinese society in general has been characterised by close family ties. This is 
particularly true of rural China, where all members of an extended household are supposed to 
share income and consumption (Ling, 198910; Fei, 198611). In terms of resource allocation, 
those who need more are supposed to consume more. Those who can earn more in the labour 
market are given the chance to earn. These patterns of behaviour reflected a family hierarchy, 
where normally a leading role was given to the most senior male of the household (Fei, 198512). 
However, in recent years, there has been a gradual fall in the number of extended families in 
both urban and rural China and a corresponding rise in the number of nuclear families13. The 
typical rural family is no longer a household with multi-generations but a nuclear household 
with simply two generations - parents and children (73% of the 1995 CASS rural sample). Some 
incentive for large extended households to sub-divide into smaller nuclear households is 
provided by the rules allocating land for building residential houses (not farming land). In 
principle, only those who are married, and having separate registration status from their parents 
will be entitled to have access to land for housing by the village. One implication of the shift 
from extended to nuclear households is to give married couples more control over the activities 
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of their immediate families. This may have given wives more influence. At the very least, issues 
of bargaining now arise less between generations (between grandparents and parents) and more 
within a generation (husband and wife). This simplifies our research. 
 
3. Hypotheses, models and methods  
 
 We focus mainly on three hypotheses: 
 H1. Increasing the relative bargaining power of women alters household expenditure 
patterns; 
 H2. Households allocate fewer resources to daughters than to sons; 
 H3. Increasing the relative bargaining power of women increases their daughters' well 
being within the family. 
 The first hypothesis concerns whether rural households exhibit consumption behaviour 
consistent with "unitary" or "collective" models. The second hypothesis concerns sex bias in the 
allocation of consumption. Although it is arguable that the two hypotheses are linked, this is not 
necessarily so. The first hypothesis is true under "collective", but not "unitary", household 
models; the second may be true under both. Therefore we propose the third hypothesis to see the 
links between mothers' bargaining power and their daughters' well-being - whether there is any 
change in spending on girls with the change in wives' bargaining power.  Appleton, Chessa and 
Hoddinott (1999) have explored this hypothesis for Uganda using similar methods to this paper, 
but found no evidence to support it14. 
 In our empirical work, we focus on a wife's education relative to her husband's as our 
main measure of bargaining power - calculating the ratio of wife's education in years to the sum 
of the years both husband and wife received. If a male household head has no spouse, the 
bargaining power should be set equivalent to zero; but for a female household head who has no 
spouse, her bargaining power is set to one, the highest, in this case.  If the fallback position is 
marital dissolution, then education is a likely determinant. More educated individuals may be 
better able to obtain paid employment or a new spouse. In non-cooperative outcomes, education 
may also be important. Ulph (1988) presents a non-cooperative model in which two household 
members each separately earn income and make household purchases from their individual 
earnings15. The Nash equilibrium has the property that expenditure patterns vary with the share 
of household income attributable to each member. Since education is likely to influence income 
shares, it should also be a determinant of expenditure patterns in non-cooperative models such 
Ulph's16. By contrast, it is not clear why a wife's education relative to her husband's would have 
any effect in a unitary household model. However, we cannot claim that the variable provides a 
decisive test of the unitary model. The ratio may matter even in a unitary model to the extent 
that female education has different market and non-market productivity effects from male 
education. 
 In addition to relative education, we use a number of other indicators of bargaining 
power based on the characteristics of the household head. Perhaps the most direct is the sex of 
the household head. This reflects the administrative convention that registered husbands are 
automatically defined as being the household heads. Women will only be defined as household 
heads if they have no husbands or if their husbands have "permanent" migrant employment (i.e. 
they are registered elsewhere). One might expect women to have more influence over household 
expenditures if they have been registered as household heads. Even if women household heads 
have husbands, the fact that the husbands are registered elsewhere presumably reduces their 
  
 
6 
 6 
day-to-day influence over household expenditures. We also include variables for the sector in 
which the heads are employed and for whether they are Communist Party members. In both 
cases, we allow these variables to have a different impact on male and on female household 
heads. 
 We test our first hypothesis by including proxies for bargaining power as explanatory 
variables in household expenditure functions. In particular, we estimate an augmented Working-
Lesser expenditure function, where the share, Wj, of total household expenditure on goods of 
type j is given by: 
 
 Wj = aj + b1jln(Y/N) + b2j lnn+ b3jSi + b4jRi + c'jZ  +  
                                                     
        k-1 +   ΘkjNk/N + ej    
        k=1 
 
where: 
 Y = household income (predicted) 
 N = household size 
 Nk = number of household members in demographic group K 
 S = 1 if household head is a man, 0 otherwise 
 R = ratio of wife's years of education to that of both  husband and wife 
 Z = vector of other control variables 
 e = error term 
and a, b, c and Θ are parameters. 
 
 
 The dependent variables are the value of purchases on the jth good as a share of total 
household purchases17. Eleven categories of goods and services were distinguished in the data: 
food; cigarettes/alcohol; clothing; transport; daily-used goods; durable goods; medical care; 
housing (repairs only); education; financial support to non-resident parents; and other non-
specified items. We separate spending on education into that on children's schooling and that on 
adults' training. Unfortunately, most of the expenditure categories used by the survey cannot be 
defined as exclusively adults' or children' goods, nor men's goods or women's goods. However, 
information from the survey shows that only a small percentage of adult women smoked (9% of 
female household heads verses 80% of male household heads). Hence, cigarette and alcohol 
spending are treated as male adult goods. Full-time education before university (children's 
schooling in our case) should be treated as children's consumption.  
 The budget share models control for household size and demographic composition. The 
Nk/N variables also provide an indirect test of our second hypothesis. The surveys do not 
directly record the resources each individual received from the household. However, some 
inferences are possible based on the effect of household demographic composition on the 
pattern of household expenditures. For example, if a higher proportion of boys in a household is 
associated with more educational spending than an equivalent higher proportion of girls, then 
this suggests that less is spent on girls' education. Moreover, Deaton (1987) has argued that 
expenditure on adult goods may be a way of gauging discrimination in favour of sons. In 
particular, if an extra boy is associated with a larger fall in expenditure on adult goods than an 
extra girl, then it could be inferred that the household is making larger sacrifices for boys than 
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for girls18.  
 To test the third hypothesis, we divide the whole sample into four quarters sorted by 
women's bargaining power - the ratio of the wife's years of education to that of the husband and 
wife combined. The budget models will be estimated separately for each quarter to see if boy-
girl discrimination varies with women's bargaining power.  
 Among the set of independent variables, we have controlled for some characteristics of 
the household head, and their interaction terms with gender. The political and occupational 
status of the household head may affect decisions about household spending. Consequently we 
include dummy variables for Communist Party membership and for occupation. The 
occupations are classified as farm-worker, unskilled (manual) non-farm worker, skilled non-
farm worker, professional, cadre, individual trader, and other non-specified category. We allow 
for the fact that more educated households may differ in their spending patterns from less 
educated households by controlling for the education, Ei, of the household head. We have also 
tried the total educational years of the husband and wife in the models instead of Ei. However, it 
has less statistically significant effects than the educational level of the household head and the 
two sets of variables are highly correlated.  
 Other variables included in the expenditure functions are household income per capita 
(to control for the effect of income) and household location. Total household income per capita 
is endogenous to expenditure shares and consequently we use its predicted value19. Dummy 
variables for household structure of generation-type are also included: nuclear households might 
have different consumption patterns compared to households with grandparents or 
grandchildren, or to those containing only one generation. Location variables included in the 
models are provincial dummy variables and whether the household lives in an officially 
designated poor county.  
 
4. The results  
 
Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1 reports the mean shares of expenditure on the different categories of goods and 
services identified in the data. The biggest proportion of household cash spending is on food 
(38%), followed by clothing (13%)20. Spending on education (mostly for schooling) is the third 
biggest consumption item (10%) but spending on cigarettes and alcohol is almost as large (9%). 
Expenditure on health care averages 5%. 
 96% households in this sample are headed by men (Appendix Table 2 refers). Compared 
with their female counterparts, male household heads are younger; more likely to be married 
than widowed or single; more often Communist Party members; better educated; and less likely 
to be full-time house-workers. However, female-headed households have higher household 
income per capita together with higher values of bank savings and houses. 80% of all male 
household heads smoke, compared to only 9% of female household heads. 
  Women have less education than men in this sample (Table 2). On average, the ratio of 
wife's years of education to that of wife and husband combined is 36 to 100. In 48% of 
households the wife's educational level is equal to that of her husband; in 41% the husband's 
educational level is higher than that of his wife; in only 6% is the wife's educational level higher 
than her husband's21.  
 The household structure by gender and age is also reported in Table 2. Household 
members aged 0-6 years are pre-schoolers; those 7-12 are of primary school age; those 13-15 are 
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of middle school age whilst those 16-18 are of high school age. We term those aged 56-65 as 
the semi-retired group, and those aged 66 and over as the aged group. 
 
The role of gender in bargaining power 
 
 Table 3 reports the expenditure functions for seven categories of goods and services: 
food (purchases only, not self-consumption), cigarettes and alcohol, school education 
(excluding adults' job-training cost), clothing, medical cost, durable goods and daily-used 
goods22.  
 We do not reject our first hypothesis. Wives' bargaining power, measured in terms of 
their education relative to that of their husbands', has a significant effect on household 
expenditure patterns, ceteris paribus. This is contrary to what would be predicted by unitary 
household models but consistent with collective models. Specifically, as wives' relative 
education rises, so does expenditure on children's education, clothing and durable goods. The 
opposite effects are apparent with purchases of food, cigarettes and alcohol, medical cost and 
daily goods. The coefficient on the relative education variable can be interpreted as the change 
in the relevant budget share arising from a unit change in the education ratio. Thus, if wives' 
education were to increase from zero to one, spending on children's education would rise by 1.1 
points. Given that the mean budget share is 9.9 percentage points, this translates into a 
proportionate rise in spending on children's education of over 10%. For clothing, the 
corresponding figure is also large. Increasing wives' educational ratio from zero to one would 
raise the clothing budget share by 1.7 percentage points. For durable goods, the effect is 0.4 
percentage points. The negative effects are also sizeable: 1.7 percentage points for food 
purchases; 1.0 percentage points for cigarettes/alcohol; and 1.1 percentage points for medical 
costs.  
 The effects of our other proxy for women's bargaining power - whether they are the 
household head - are consistent with the results from the relative education proxy in all but two 
cases (food purchases and durable goods). In particular, households headed by women spend 
more on education and clothing and less on alcohol/tobacco.  
 Our results seem consistent with the hypothesis of "maternal altruism": that women 
prefer to spend more on "children's goods" and less on adult goods. However, our measures of 
children's goods (schooling) and adult goods (cigarettes/alcohol) are rather specific. Although 
undoubtedly a children's good, schooling is also an investment in human capital. Parental 
education may complement learning acquired from school. Indeed, it is conceivable that 
mother's education is more of a complement with child schooling than father's education. This 
provides one possible explanation for our finding within a "unitary household" framework. In 
China, women smoke much less than men, indicating that cigarettes at least are more "men's 
goods" than "women's goods". Alcohol may also be more of a man's good, although perhaps to 
a lesser degree. Nonetheless, this does not invalidate referring to the alcohol/cigarettes 
expenditure function as a test of the unitary model. Even if alcohol/cigarettes are exclusively 
consumed by men, after controlling for the proportion of men in the household, proxies of 
female bargaining power should have no effect.  
 One surprising finding worthy of comment is that the wives' education relative to their 
husbands, and having a woman household head, both lower expenditure on medical care. Were 
the wives' educational ratio to rise from zero to one, spending on medical costs would fall by 
one percentage point (a proportionate decrease of approximately one fifth). This might reflect 
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women giving a lower priority to health care. However, there is an alternative and more 
plausible explanation: the wives' education may improve the health of their families, so making 
health care less necessary.  
 
Boy-girl discrimination  
 Inferences about intra-household resource allocation can be made by examining the 
coefficients of household age and gender groups. This shows how household expenditure on 
particular types of goods and services vary with the age and gender composition of the 
household.  
 We argued a priori that cigarette and alcohol are mainly men's goods. This is reflected 
in the results. All the included age-sex groups have negative coefficients compared with the 
default group of men aged 19-55. Applying Deaton's (1987) test, there is some evidence of 
discrimination in favour of the youngest boys and against the youngest girls. In particular, the 
coefficient on boys aged 0-6 is -3.4% (significant at 1%) compared with only -2.1% (significant 
at 10%) for girls aged 0-6. This difference in the coefficients is statistically significant at the 2% 
level and suggests that men sacrifice more for very young boys than for very young girls. 
However, the reverse is true of children aged 13-15: more sacrifices seem to be made for middle 
school girls than middle school boys.  
 Perhaps the most disturbing finding is that boys aged 6 years or below have a coefficient 
on medical cost more than double that for girls of the same age. Note that the coefficients 
calculated in the model are relative to the effect of the male group aged 19-55: they are not the 
actual medical spending on the groups. However, the coefficients suggest that over 50% more is 
spent on the health care of a young boy than on that of a young girl23,24. This may imply 
discrimination against young girls: households may treat their boys' health problems more 
seriously than their girls'. Alternatively, it may merely be that there is a higher incidence of child 
illness among young boys than among young girls. It is well known that boys are biologically 
more susceptible to illness at a young age than are girls. However, it is unlikely that the 
biological differential is sufficient to warrant a 50% differential in health spending per child. 
Indeed, the sex ratios amongst children aged 0-6 do not seem consistent with higher infant 
mortality: if anything, there is evidence of excess female infant mortality.  
 Only 3.00% of household members are girls aged six or under, whereas 3.69% are boys 
of the same age. This contrasts with figures from Côte d'Ivoire, where the proportions of young 
girls and boys are aged under six are almost exactly equal (9.0% and 9.2% of all household 
members respectively)25. These sex ratios suggest that, as Sen (1990) asserted, China may suffer 
from "missing women"26. Official statistics also show high male-female sex ratios, rising in the 
1980s. In 1988, the sex ratio of children aged 0-4 was 106.1027.  The sex ratio of children aged 
0-6 increased to 110.50 in 199028. The ratio in 1993 was even higher: 114.1629. Our figure for 
1995 is much higher than this, at 1.23.  
 Traditionally boys have been more welcome to rural households in China. Infant girls 
have sometimes been found abandoned in orphanages and there have been suggestions that they 
were sometimes victims of infanticide30. This may reflect some old Chinese traditions of 
inheritance and succession to property. According to the old civil law that applied before the 
1930s, daughters and widows could not inherit household assets. If the deceased (male) had no 
sons, his household assets could only be inherited by his brother's sons if there were any. If the 
deceased had no brothers, any other male relative should inherit his assets but not his own 
daughters or widow. However, these pro-son traditions were greatly weakened during the 
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middle part of this century. A new civil law introduced by the Nationalist Government in the 
1930s had changed the old law: daughters as well as widows could inherit household assets 
(Item 1147, Civil Law, 1928). This boy-girl discrimination may also reflect the tenacious 
custom to support old-age parents in rural China: boys are always expected to support their 
parents in old age, whereas daughters transfer to their husbands' family (normally in other 
village). The sons stay in the village, inheriting both the assets and the duty to support their 
parents. This can provide a basis for boy-preference among mothers as well as fathers. In the 
1950s, the Communist government gave official support for equality between the sexes. 
Substantial job discrimination and wage discrimination against women are officially outlawed. 
Researchers have indeed found that urban women have a high rate of job participation in China 
relative to other countries. Possession of education may protect Chinese women against 
discrimination, or give them access to jobs with less discrimination. Neither the 1953 census nor 
the 1964 census showed an excess of boys over girls.  
 Things appear to have begun to change in the late 1970s. The 1982 census showed more 
boys than girls, with a sex ratio of 107 (for more detailed analyses of this phenomenon, see 
Hull, 199031; Davin, 199032; Johaansson and Nygren, 199133; Coale, 199134; Zheng et al, 
199335; Johnson, 199636). Three proximate causes have been put forward for the rise in the 
male-female sex ratio: under-reporting of girls (for example, if more are in orphanages); 
infanticide; and pre-natal sex selection. Although the three explanations differ in the degree to 
which they are malign, they all imply a pro-son preference. Two factors may explain why this 
preference appeared to intensify after the late 1970s. The first is on the demand side, with the 
introduction of the one-child policy launched in 197937. It seems likely that if Chinese couples 
can only have one child, they will favour a boy. If couples were free to have more children, 
some might prefer a balance between sons and daughters, weakening any sex bias. However, the 
relaxation of the one-child policy to allow rural households to have another child if the first one 
were a girl does not appear to halt the rise in the male-female sex ratio. The second change is on 
the supply side, with the increasing availability since 1980 of services which can identify the sex 
of a foetus. However, we cannot dismiss the possibility that the sex ratios could be due to some 
cruelty happening to girls before or after birth. Consistent with this, our findings give rise to 
some concern about discrimination against very young girls in terms of health care. 
 Any discrimination against girls in terms of health care does not appear to be extended 
to schooling. Household spending on schooling varies similarly with proportions of boys and 
girls, suggesting no discrimination in outlays on school. Even at the high school age, when the 
presence of boys is associated with greater school spending than is the presence of girls, the 
effects are quantitatively small.  
 
Does mothers' bargaining power affect boy-girl discrimination? 
 In planning this research, we considered three indicators of women's bargaining power: 
the ratio of the wife's education relative to her husband's; the wife's working time relative to her 
husband's; and the proportion of the wife's cash income to the total earned by both the husband 
and wife. Ultimately, we decided to use the indicator of wife's bargaining power proxied by 
education. This variable proved to be statistically more significant in the regressions but was 
also highly correlated with women's share of the cash income. We divide the whole sample into 
quarters by ordering the education ratio. The first quarter represents households in which wives 
have the lowest bargaining power, and the fourth, the highest. Table 4 provides the mean 
characteristics by the quartered samples. This shows that women's share of cash income is 
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higher in quarters with higher relative education. However, a woman's share of working time 
does not vary by quarter in this way: women in quarters 1 and 3 have lower percentages of 
working time than those in quarters 2 and 4. Therefore we introduced the women's share of 
working time as an additional independent variable. Aside from this, we employ the regression 
models used in Table 3 but estimate them only for three items of expenditure: cigarettes and 
alcohol; medical costs; and education. We find that mother's higher bargaining power affects 
boy-girl discrimination in terms of cigarette spending, education and medical expenditure, but 
usually in the opposite direction to that expected: girls appear to do worse relative to boys in 
households where women have higher bargaining power. 
 Superficially, the sex ratio is an example of these unexpected findings: there are fewer 
girls relative to boys in households where female bargaining power is high. Table 5 shows that 
the lowest quarter (women with lowest bargaining power) has the lowest boy-girl sex ratio 
among the four sub-samples - 107 compared to 115, 114 and 113 for quarters 2, 3 and 4 
respectively. However, the association between higher female bargaining power and higher boy-
girl sex ratios is only apparent when comparing the quarter with the highest bargaining power 
with the rest. Moreover, the reverse association exists if attention is confined only to children 
under seven.  
 More compelling evidence on the unexpected effects of female bargaining power on 
boy-girl discrimination is provided by data on medical expenditure, spending on alcohol and 
cigarettes, and on education (results not reported in tables, but available upon request). 
Households with higher women's bargaining power do not exhibit less boy-girl discrimination 
in their household medical spending. As a matter of fact, households in the fourth quarter yield a 
coefficient on young boys (aged 0-6) 3 times greater than that of young girls (0.081 versus 
0.025). Similarly, in the top two quarters in terms of women's bargaining power, spending on 
cigarettes and alcohol falls less with the presence of girls than boys, and the opposite is true for 
the bottom two quarters (Table 6).   
 Households with women of higher bargaining power tend to spend more on their 
daughters' education up to middle-school level than on their sons'. This is the same result we 
obtained from the analysis of the whole sample (Table 3). But mother's high bargaining power 
does not raise the coefficient relating to daughters of high school age. By contrast, it does so for 
boys. In the quarter with the highest women's bargaining power, the coefficient on high-school 
aged boys is twice that on girls (0.34 compared to 0.15). In the lowest quarter, the gap is far 
more modest (0.23 compared to 0.19) (Table 7). These variations in the relative effects of high-
school age girls and boys reflect variations in enrolment rates (Table 8). Enrolment rates for 
boys of high school age rise slightly with female bargaining power. However, for girls, high-
school enrolment rates are lowest for households with either the highest or lowest female 
bargaining power.  
 There appears to be no gender discrimination in terms of educational spending per 
student. This can be seen by splitting the demographic variables for children into those for 
children in school and children out of school. The sensitivity of educational expenditure to 
children in school provides an indirect measure of educational spending per student. After 
carrying out this decomposition, we see that educational spending responds equally to the 
presence of male or female students for all age groups. This is invariant to female bargaining 
power, being true for each of the four quarters of the sample (Table 9).  
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5. Conclusions 
 Our findings have confirmed that the consumption behaviour of Chinese rural 
households is more consistent with a collective model than with a unitary model of household 
behaviour. Men and women appear to have different preferences in consumption. Women's 
bargaining power strengthens their influence on household consumption decisions: the share of 
spending on children's education and clothing rises with women's bargaining power. 
Conversely, the budget share of alcohol and cigarettes falls as women's bargaining power 
increases. 
 We also find suggestions of discrimination against very young daughters (aged 0 to 6 
years) in favour of sons. The evidence is of three kinds. First, young daughters lead to less of a 
reduction in the share of spending on cigarettes and alcohol than young sons. Following Deaton, 
this may reflect adults making fewer material sacrifices for young daughters than for young 
sons38. Secondly, we find that the presence of young girls in the household is associated with 
much smaller increases in the share of spending on health care than is the presence of young 
boys. One rough estimate is that 50% more is spent on the health care of young boys than young 
girls. Whilst it is true that young boys are biologically more vulnerable than young girls, it is 
unlikely that frailty can fully account for a discrepancy on this scale. Thirdly, we find that the 
sex ratio among children aged 0-6 is very uneven, with 123 boys for every 100 young girls. 
Whilst not as bad as some sex ratios reported in the past in rural China, the figure compares 
poorly with the virtually even sex ratio in many other developing countries. Taken together, 
these results provide some evidence in support of Sen's assertion of serious pro-son bias in 
China.  
 We find no evidence in favour of our third hypothesis: that higher mothers' bargaining 
power reduces boy-girl discrimination. If anything, the reverse is true. Sex ratios are less 
favourable to girls in households with high female bargaining power, although this does not 
necessarily imply greater excess female mortality. However, households with high female 
bargaining power appear to spend much more (relative to other households) on medical care for 
young boys compared to young girls. Similarly, as female bargaining power increases, the 
negative impact of young boys relative to young girls on spending on cigarettes and alcohol 
becomes stronger. This is consistent with adults (presumably, mainly men) in households 
making fewer material sacrifices for their young daughters than for their young sons as female 
bargaining power rises. Finally, girls of high-school age are associated with smaller increases in 
educational spending relative to boys in households with high female bargaining power. This 
reflects lower enrolment ratios for girls in such households. In summary, whilst there is 
evidence that women's bargaining power affects household allocation and that there is some 
boy-girl discrimination, there is no evidence that women's bargaining power reduces boy-girl 
discrimination. In rural China women may be no less prone to favour their sons over their 
daughters than are men. This may be based on the expectation that they will be supported by 
their sons rather than their daughters in old age. 
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 Table 1 
 Dependent Variables Used in the Analysis 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
       mean     standard 
           deviation 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Total household cash expenditure 
 (in yuan),       3622.34   5059.72 
Expenditures shares:  
1. Food (excluding self-consumption)   0.3778      0.1709 
2. Cigarettes & alcohol       0.0915      0.0727 
3. Cloth        0.1315      0.0947 
4. Transport         0.0325      0.0725 
5. Daily goods         0.0629      0.0560 
6. Durable goods        0.0253      0.0697 
7. Medical cost        0.0501      0.0852  
8. Education         0.0987      0.1319   
  of which for schooling only    0.0944      0.1282  
9. Housing (repairing)        0.0212      0.0740 
10. Paying to parents        0.0039      0.0307 
11. Other (non specified)      0.1079      0.1145 
 
Number of observations    7997     
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source: 1995 Rural Household Survey. 
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 Table 2 
 
 Independent Variables Used in the Analysis 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable        mean  standard 
           deviation 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Male household head       0.9585  0.1994 
Wife's years of education   
over years of education      0.3604  0.2079 
of husband and wife combined 
educational level of household head: 
high school and above       0.1465  0.3537 
middle school        0.4175  0.4931 
4-6 years of primary school      0.3177  0.4656 
1-3 years of primary school       0.0585  0.2347 
no education        0.0596  0.2368 
 
Communist Party member      0.1457  0.3528 
male Communist Party member     0.1408  0.3478 
 
household head mainly works as: 
1. farm worker        0.8585  0.3485 
2. manual worker       0.0293  0.1688 
3. skilled worker       0.0008   0.0273 
4. professional        0.0031  0.0558 
5. cadre        0.0075  0.0862 
6. individual trader       0.0167  0.1283 
7. other (non-specified)      0.0839  0.2772 
 
male household head mainly works as: 
1. farm worker        0.7294  0.4442 
2. manual worker       0.0714  0.2574 
3. skilled worker       0.0158  0.1245 
4. professional        0.0154  0.1230 
5. cadre        0.0569  0.2316 
6. individual trader       0.0355  0.1850 
7. other (non-specified)      0.0594  0.2364 
 
log (no. of household members)       1.4236  0.3067 
log (predicted household income per capita) 
            7.6830  0.5879 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2 -continued 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Age-sex composition of household: 
male aged 0-6         0.0369 0.0909 
male aged 7-12        0.0638 0.1221 
male aged 13-15        0.0331 0.0859 
male aged 16-18        0.0323 0.0857 
male aged 19-55        0.2993 0.1507 
male aged 56-65        0.0352 0.1034 
male aged 66-           0.0178  0.0656 
female aged 0-6        0.0300 0.0837 
female aged 7-12        0.0538 0.1108 
female aged 13-15        0.0271 0.760 
female aged 16-18        0.0298 0.797 
female aged 19-55        0.2905 0.1356 
female aged 56-65        0.0274 0.0896 
female aged 66-        0.0230 0.0722 
 
one generation household        0.0405 0.1971 
two generation household       0.7304 0.4437 
three generation household       0.2226 0.4160 
other types of household        0.0065 0.804 
household in poor county       0.2263 0.4185 
 
province: 
Beijing           0.0125  0.1111 
Hebei           0.0623 0.2416 
Shangxi           0.0375 0.1900 
Liaoning          0.0375 0.1900 
Jilin           0.0375 0.1900 
Jiangsu              0.0624 0.2419 
Zhejian          0.0500 0.2179 
Anhui           0.0563 0.2305 
Jiangxi           0.0438  0.2046 
Shangdong          0.0875 0.2826 
Henan           0.0875 0.2826 
Hubei           0.0503 0.2185 
Hunan           0.0625 0.2421 
Guangdong          0.0625 0.2421 
Sichuan          0.0998 0.2997 
Gueizhou          0.0375 0.1900 
Yunnan           0.0375 0.1900 
Shaanxi          0.0375 0.1900 
Gansu           0.0375 0.1900 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: 1995 Rural Household Survey 
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 Table 3 
 Two Stage Least Squares Budget Share Regressions 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
             
     model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
             
     food  cigarettes  education cloth 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
intercept     0.4088(5.6)***  0.1676(5.2)***  0.1378(2.9)**  0.1571(3.9)*** 
 
male household head  -0.0253(2.2)**  0.0225(4.6)*** -0.0075(1.0) -0.0089(1.4) 
wife's education years  -0.0169(1.7)* -0.0101(2.4)***  0.0108(1.7)*  0.0171(3.1)*** 
over the years of education 
of husband & wife combined 
 
educational level of HH head:   
high school and above    -   -   -   - 
middle school   -0.0228(2.9)*** -0.0105(3.1)***  0.0182(3.6)***  0.0028(0.6) 
6 years of primary school  -0.0141(2.1)** -0.0065(2.3)**  0.0130(3.1)***  0.0046(1.3) 
3 years of primary school & below -0.0050(0.8) -0.0077(2.8)***  0.0102(2.5)*** -0.0009(0.2) 
 
Communist Party member  -0.0206(0.7)  0.0221(1.8)** -0.0083(0.4)  0.0273(1.8)* 
not CP  member     -   -   -   - 
male Communist Party member  0.0182(0.6) -0.0150(1.2)  0.0057(0.3) -0.0333(2.1)** 
female non CP member    -   -   -   - 
 
household head mainly works as: 
1. farm worker     -   -   -   - 
2. manual worker    0.0189(0.5) -0.0188(1.2) -0.0104(0.4) -0.0313(1.6) 
3. skilled worker    0.0337(0.6) -0.0198(0.7) -0.0084(0.2) -0.0167(0.5) 
4. professional   -0.0355(0.7)  -0.0307(1.3) -0.0463(1.3)  0.0423(1.4) 
5. cadre    -0.1207(2.2)* -0.0075(0.3)  0.0201(0.6) -0.0166(0.6) 
6. individual trader  -0.0611(0.4) -0.0356(0.5) -0.0748(0.7) -0.0011(0.0) 
7. other (non-specified)  -0.0504(1.5) -0.0051(0.3)  0.0214(0.9)  0.0151(0.8) 
 
male household head mainly works as: 
1. farm worker     -   -   -   - 
2. manual worker   -0.0242(0.6)  0.0198(1.3) -0.0174(0.8)  0.0238(1.2) 
3. skilled worker   -0.0578(0.8) -0.0007(0.0) -0.0279(0.6)  0.0235(0.6) 
4. professional    0.0090(0.1)  0.0352(1.3)  0.0370(0.9) -0.0518(1.5) 
5. cadre     0.1270(1.8)*  0.0275(0.9) -0.0189(0.4)  0.0270(0.7) 
6. individual trader   0.0946(0.6)  0.0156(0.2)  0.0577(0.5)  0.0024(0.0) 
7. other (non-specified)   0.0467(1.3)  0.0123(0.8) -0..286(1.3) -0.0105(0.5) 
log (no. of household members) -0.0210(2.0)** -0.0151(3.3)*** -0.0181(2.6)*** -0.0145(2.5)*** 
log (predicted household 
    income per capita)   0.0050(0.6) -0.0028(0.9) -0.0163(3.4)*** -0.0022(0.5) 
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Table 3 - continued 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
     model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Age-sex composition of household:  
male aged 0-6    0.0866(3.7)*** -0.0335(3.2)*** -0.0167(1.1)  0.0198(1.5) 
male aged 7-12   -0.0400(2.1)**  -0.0395(4.7)***  0.148(12.1)***  0.0284(2.7)*** 
male aged 13-15   -0.0882(3.7)*** -0.0430(4.2)***  0.258(16.7)***  0.0228(1.7)* 
male aged 16-18   -0.1681(7.0)*** -0.0652(6.2)***  0.238(15.3)***  0.0567(4.3)*** 
male aged 19-55      -   -   -   - 
male aged 56-65    0.0933(4.1)*** -0.0234(2.4)** -0.0070(0.4) -0.0467(3.7)*** 
male aged 66-    0.1505(4.7)*** -0.0207(1.5)  0.0038(0.2) -0.5190(3.0)*** 
female aged 0-6    0.0966(3.8)*** -0.0206(1.9)* -0.0058(0.3)  0.0143(1.0) 
female aged 7-12   -0.0245(1.2) -0.0449(5.1)***  0.169(12.7)***  0.0206(1.8)* 
female aged 13-15  -0.1306(4.9)*** -0.0821(7.1)***  0.269(15.7)***  0.0408(2.8)*** 
female aged 16-18  -0.1002(3.8)*** -0.0683(5.9)***  0.210(12.4)***  0.0312(2.1)** 
female aged 19-55  -0.0001(0.0) -0.0311(3.6)**  0.0084(0.7)  0.0164(1.5) 
female aged 56-65   0.0702(2.5)*** -0.0310(2.5)*** -0.0063(0.3) -0.0041(0.3)  
female aged 66-    0.0879(2.8)*** -0.0457(3.4)*** -0.0270(1.4) -0.0303(1.8)* 
 
one generation household   0.0167(1.4) -0.0059(1.1) -0.0032(0.4) -0.0300(4.6)*** 
two generation household    -   -   -   - 
three generation household  -0.0106(1.7)*  0.0012(0.5) -0.0059(1.5)  0.0062(1.9)* 
other types of household   0.0123(0.6) -0.0104(1.0) -0.0207(1.3)  0.0043(0.3) 
 
household in a poor county  -0.0115(2.4)**  0.0152(7.2)*** -0.0091(2.9)***  0.0028(1.0) 
household in a rich county   -   -   -   - 
province: 
Beijing     0.0315(1.8)* -0.0343(4.3)***  0.0077(0.7)  0.0050(0.5) 
Hebei     0.0266(2.3)** -0.0190(3.8)*** -0.0475(6.4)***  0.0253(4.0)*** 
Shangxi      0.0150(1.1) -0.0285(4.5)*** -0.0357(3.9)***  0.0535(6.8)*** 
Liaoning     0.0505(3.9)*** -0.0409(7.1)*** -0.0275(2.2)**  0.0107(1.5) 
Jilin     0.0514(4.0)*** -0.0356(6.4)*** -0.0344(4.2)***  0.0148(2.1)** 
Jiangsu         -   -   -   - 
Zhejian     0.0286(2.6)*** -0.0096(2.0)** -0.0158(2.2)** -0.0330(5.4)*** 
Anhui     0.0096(0.7) -0.0026(1.1) -0.0268(3.4)*** -0.0012(0.2) 
Jiangxi     0.0262(2.1)** -0.0404(7.2)*** -0.0341(4.1)*** -0.0193(2.8)*** 
Shangdong    0.0451(4.5)*** -0.0189(4.3)*** -0.0088(1.3)  0.0100(1.8)* 
Henan    -0.0387(3.4)*** -0.0246(4.9)*** -0.0193(2.6)***  0.0643(10.2)*** 
Hubei    -0.0842(6.8)*** -0.0110(2.0)**  0.0486(6.1)*** -0.0106(1.6) 
Hunan     0.0191(1.5) -0.0386(6.9)***  0.0070(0.8) -0.0368(5.3)*** 
Guangdong    0.1192(12) *** -0.0552(12) ***  0.0488(7.3)*** -0.0710(12.6)*** 
Sichuan    -0.0202(1.6) -0.0117(2.1)** -0.0139(1.7)* -0.0118(1.7)* 
Gueizhou   -0.0282(2.0)* -0.0211(3.4)*** -0.0483(5.2)***  0.0158(2.0)** 
Yunnan     0.0684(4.9)*** -0.0078(1.3) -0.0146(1.6)* -0.0154(2.0)** 
Shaanxi    -0.0638(4.5)*** -0.0240(3.9)*** -0.0112(1.1)  0.0386(5.0)*** 
Gansu    -0.0436(2.8)*** -0.0289(4.2)*** -0.0010(0.1)  0.0214(2.5)*** 
 
F-statistics    22.798  14.035  42.756  26.346 
adjusted R2      0.1327   0.0838   0.2267   0.1511 
sample size    7977  7977  7977  7977 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 - continued 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
             
     model 5  model 6  model 7 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
             
     durable  medical cost daily goods  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
intercept      0.0195(0.6)  0.0317(0.8)  0.1056(4.1)*** 
 
male household head    0.0038(0.7)  0.0079(1.3)  0.0041(1.1) 
wife's education years     0.0043(1.0)* -0.0110(2.2)** -0.0010(0.3)  
over the years of education of 
husband & wife combined 
 
educational level of household head:   
high school and above    -   -   -   
middle school     0.0050(1.4) -0.0061(1.5) -0.0018(0.7)     
6 years of primary school    0.0024(0.8) -0.0057(1.7)* -0.0011(0.5)     
3 years of primary school & below   0.0006(0.2) -0.0019(0.5) -0.0024(1.0)  
 
Communist Party member   -0.0230(1.8)** -0.0020(0.1) -0.0040(0.4)  
not CP  member     -   -   -   
male Communist Party member   0.0257(2.1)** -0.0018(0.1)  0.0024(0.3)  
female non CP member    -   -   -   
 
household head mainly works as: 
1. farm worker     -   -   -   
2. manual worker     0.0207(1.4)  0.0196(1.1)  0.0028(0.2)  
3. skilled worker    -0.0021(0.1)  0.0026(0.1) -0.0058(0.2)  
4. professional     0.0061(0.3)  -0.0022(0.1)  0.0404(2.1)**  
5. cadre     -0.0150(0.6)  -0.0061(0.2) -0.0240(1.2)  
6. individual trader    0.1379(2.0)** -0.0390(0.5)  0.0307(0.5)  
7. other (non-specified)   -0.0165(1.1) -0.0092(0.5) -0.0173(1.4)  
 
male household head mainly works as: 
1. farm worker     -   -   -   
2. manual worker    -0.0024(0.2) -0.0132(0.7) -0.0036(0.2)  
3. skilled worker     0.0562(1.9)  0.0072(0.2)  0.0174(0.7)  
4. professional     0.0092(3.4)  0.0020(0.1) -0.0574(2.7)***  
5. cadre     -0.0039(1.3)  0.0164(0.4)  0.0077(0.3)  
6. individual trader   -0.1229(1.8)*  0.0198(0.2) -0.0275(0.5)  
7. other (non-specified)    0.0570(1.7)*  0.0037(0.2)  0.0202(1.7)*  
 
log (no. of household members)   0.0013(0.3) -0.0043(0.8) -0.0080(2.2)**  
log (predicted household  
    income per capita)     0.0021(0.6) -0.0016(0.4) -0.0048(1.9)*  
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Table 3 - continued 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
     model 5  model 6   model 7 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Age-sex composition of household:      
male aged 0-6     -0.0223(2.2)**  0.0692(5.5)*** -0.0130(1.6)  
male aged 7-12    -0.0193(2.3)***  0.0223(2.2)** -0.0151(2.3)**  
male aged 13-15    -0.0234(2.3)***  0.0061(0.4)    -0.0158(1.9)**  
male aged 16-18    -0.0218(2.1)***  0.0010(0.1)    -0.0148(1.8)*  
male aged 19-55      -   -   -   
male aged 56-65    -0.0328(3.3)***  0.0472(3.9)*** -0.0001(0.0)  
male aged 66-     0.0314(2.2)***  0.0358(2.1)**  0.0018(0.2)  
female aged 0-6    -0.0261(2.4)***  0.0340(2.5)*** -0.0161(1.8)*  
female aged 7-12    -0.0300(3.1)***  0.0201(1.8)* -0.0245(3.5)***  
female aged 13-15   -0.0123(1.1)     0.0136(0.9) -0.0098(1.0)  
female aged 16-18   -0.0369(3.2)***  0.0076(0.5) -0.0060(0.6)     
female aged 19-55    0.0018(0.2)  0.0429(4.0)***  0.0137(1.9)**  
female aged 56-65   -0.0009(0.8)     0.0468(3.1)***  0.0049(0.5)  
female aged 66-    -0.0011(0.8)     0.0494(3.0)***  0.0017(0.2)  
one generation household   -0.0034(0.7)  0.0075(1.2) -0.0099(2.4)***  
two generation household     -   -   -   
three generation household    0.0042(1.6)*  0.0031(0.9)  0.0004(0.2)  
other types of household    0.0017(0.2) -0.0118(1.0) -0.0053(0.7)  
household in a poor county   -0.0053(2.5)***  0.0056(2.2)** -0.0017(1.0)  
household in a rich county     -   -   -   
province: 
Beijing      0.0187(2.4)**  0.0170(1.8)* -0.0168(2.7)***  
Hebei     -0.0120(2.4)**  0.0104(1.7)* -0.0006(0.2)  
Shangxi      -0.0172(2.7)***  0.0098(1.3)  0.0054(1.1)  
Liaoning     -0.0191(3.4)***  0.0049(0.7) -0.0094(2.2)**  
Jilin     -0.0243(4.4)***  0.0253(3.8)*** -0.0111(2.5)***  
Jiangsu         -   -   -   
Zhejian     -0.0111(2.3)**  0.0207(3.6)***  0.0009(2.1)**  
Anhui     -0.0111(2.1)** -0.0019(0.3)  0.0121(2.8)***  
Jiangxi     -0.0136(2.5)**  0.0172(2.5)***  0.0205(4.7)***  
Shangdong    -0.0107(2.5)**  0.0047(0.9) -0.0004(0.1)  
Henan     -0.0137(2.7)*** -0.0247(4.0)***  0.0039(0.9)     
Hubei     -0.0147(2.7)*** -0.0176(2.7)***  0.0084(2.0)***  
Hunan     -0.0171(3.1)*** -0.0044(0.6)  0.0160(3.6)***  
Guangdong    -0.0120(2.7)*** -0.0084(1.5)  0.0033(0.9)  
Sichuan     -0.0155(2.9)*** -0.0128(1.9)**  0.0034(0.7)   
Gueizhou    -0.0181(3.0)*** -0.0202(2.7)***  0.0349(7.1)***   
Yunnan     -0.0141(2.4)*** -0.0116(1.6)  0.0129(2.7)***   
Shaanxi     -0.0095(1.6) -0.0424(5.7)***  0.0176(3.6)***  
Gansu     -0.0127(1.9)* -0.0404(4.9)***  0.0018(0.3)  
F-statistics     4.240   5.693   6.300   
adjusted R2      0.0222   0.0319   0.0359   
sample size    7977  7977  7977   
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The omitted dummies in these models are female household head, educational level at 3 years or lower of 
HH heads, non-communist party member, HH head working in the farming sector, husband working in the farming 
sector, male aged from 19-55, household of two generations, household located in the rich county and Jiangsu 
province. *** denotes the significance level at 1% and below, ** at 5% and * at 10% . 
Source: 1995 Rural Household Survey. 
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 Table 4 
 
 Mean Characteristics by Quartered Sample in Terms of Wives' Bargaining Power 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Variable          Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4  
    (lowest female     (highest female 
    bargaining power)    bargaining power) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
gender indicators between husband and wives: 
male household head      0.9905     0.9870     0.9640     0.8923 
female household head      0.0095     0.0130     0.0360     0.1076 
 
wife's education years over 
that of both husband and  
wife combined         0.0727     0.3119     0.4849     0.5726 
 
ratio of wives' working time  
(in day) to the total of both  
husbands and wives combined    0.3522     0.4480     0.3465     0.5557 
 
cash income earned by husband  663.9725  850.0365  932.0790  636.1994 
(in yuan) 
cash income earned by wife   87.5865  140.1900  206.9935  166.7671 
(in yuan) 
% of wives' cash income to 
husbands'      7.6606    20.0329    39.0341    67.4826 
 
households: 
 
actual income per capita  2298.9  2553.7  2763.0  2253.1 
 
ratio of household head receiving high- 
school education & above to the 
quartered sample      0.13     0.14     0.24      0.07 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source: 1995 Rural Household Survey. 
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 Table 5 
 Comparison of the Quartered sub-samples: Number of Children by Age Group and by Sex, and Age and Sex Ratios 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Aged 0-6 Boy-girl  Aged 7-12 Boy-girl Aged 13-15    Aged 16-18 Boy-girl Boy-girl  
  boys girls ratio   boys girls ratio   boy girl ratio  boy girl ratio  ratio 
                  (all ages)
   
 __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
________ 
Quarter 1 (lowest female bargaining power) 
   287  226 127   463  429 108   302  292 103   304  319  95  107 
Quarter 2 
   362  259 139   542  513 106   326  246 132   316  328  96  115 
Quarter 3   
  354  296 120   629  538 117   259  220 118   242  243 100  114 
Quarter 4 (highest female bargaining power) 
   350  322 109   627  510 123   279  266 105   279  262 106  113 
 
Total  1353 1103 123  2261 1990 114  1166 1024 114  1141 1152  99  112 
      
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source:  1995 Rural Household Survey 
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 Table 6 
 Does Mothers' High Bargaining Power Make Their Daughters Suffer Less  
 in Terms of Cigarette Spending?  
 Second Stage Regression Models by Mothers' Bargaining Power 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
dependent variable:  
 ratio of spending on cigarette and alcohol to total household spending 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
gender-age group:  Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
   (lowest female     (highest female 
   bargaining power)     bargaining power) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
male aged      0-6    -0.0331     -0.0124     -0.0320*    -0.0521*** 
male aged      7-12   -0.0352**  -0.0338**    -0.0297**    -0.0527*** 
male aged     13-15   -0.0679***  -0.0173     -0.0413**    -0.0352* 
male aged     16-18   -0.0553***   -0.0735***    -0.0693***    -0.0589*** 
male aged     19-55    0     0      0      0 
male aged     56-65    -0.0238       0.0157       -0.0482**    -0.0234 
male aged     66-    -0.0389    -0.0133        -0.0032    -0.0142 
female aged    0-6    -0.0458*   -0.0400*     0.0031    -0.0195 
female aged    7-12   -0.0413**   -0.0365**    -0.0517***    -0.0510*** 
female aged   13-15   -0.0874***   -0.0728***    -0.0618***    -0.0942*** 
female aged   16-18   -0.0555***   -0.0873***    -0.0754***    -0.0514** 
female aged   19-55   -0.0115     -0.0513***    -0.0046    -0.0455*** 
female aged   56-65   -0.0097    -0.1263***    -0.0008    -0.0275 
female aged   66-    -0.0535***   -0.1013***    -0.0012    -0.0369 
 
adjusted R2     0.0764       0.0741        0.0874     0.0882 
F-values      4.845      4.719      5.452        5.490 
dependent means      0.0987      0.0923       0.0877     0.0871 
number of observations  1999  1999   1999   1997 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: (1)  For brevity, we only report the coefficients on variables for proportions of the certain age-sex groups. 
Other independent variables included in these models but not reported in the table are those referred to 
Table 3.  
 (2)  *** denotes statistics significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
 
Source: 1995 Rural Household Survey.  
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 Table 7 
 
 Does Mothers' High Bargaining Power Increase Household Spending on Their Daughter's Education? 
 Second Stage Regression Models by Mothers' Bargaining Power: 
 with Selected Coefficients on School-aged Children by Age and Sex 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dependent variable:  
ratio of household spending on education to the total household cash spending 
 
   Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
   (lowest female     (highest female 
   bargaining power)    bargaining power) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
boys aged  7-12   0.1902*** 0.2054*** 0.1869*** 0.1977*** 
boys aged 13-15   0.3445*** 0.2957*** 0.3059*** 0.3060*** 
boys aged 16-18   0.2332*** 0.2641*** 0.2641*** 0.3438*** 
girls aged  7-12   0.2051*** 0.1658*** 0.2373*** 0.2142*** 
girls aged 13-15   0.2921*** 0.2935*** 0.3050*** 0.4087*** 
girls aged 16-18   0.1928*** 0.2766*** 0.3547*** 0.1491*** 
 
adjusted R2   0.2634  0.2001  0.2206  0.2271 
F-values   17.627  12.628  14.159  14.647 
dependent means   0.08438   0.09636   0.09517   0.10172 
number of observations 1999  1999  1999  1997 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: (1)  For brevity, we only report the coefficients on variables for proportions of school-aged groups. Other 
independent variables included in these models but not reported in the table are those referred to Table 3. 
 
 (2)  *** denotes statistics significance at 1%. 
 
Source: 1995 Rural Household Survey.  
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 Table 8 
 Number of Children by Age and Sex and School Enrolment Rates of the Quartered Samples 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
     Total   Quarter 1  Quarter 2  Quarter 3  Quarter 4 
        (lowest female        (highest female 
        bargaining power)       bargaining power) 
     number rate  number rate  number rate number rate   number rate 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
boys aged  7-12 in school   2059    413    493     569    584 
boys aged  7-12 not in school   202     50      49     60     43 
     0.91   0.89   0.91   0.91   0.93 
girls aged  7-12 in school   1791    375    449    508    459 
girls aged  7-12 not in school   199     54     64     30     51 
     0.90   0.87   0.88   0.94   0.90 
boys aged 13-15 in school   1046    264    291    241    250 
boys aged 13-15 not in school   120     38     35     18     29 
     0.90   0.87   0.89   0.93   0.90 
girls aged 13-15 in school    866    238    202    201    225 
girls aged 13-15 not in school   158     54     44     19     41 
     0.85   0.82   0.82   0.91   0.85 
boys aged 16-18 in school     538    135    156    118    129 
boys aged 16-18 not in school    603    169    160    124    150 
     0.47   0.44   0.49   0.49   0.46 
girls aged 16-18 in school    496    122    160    111    103 
girls aged 16-18 not in school   656    197    168    132    159 
     0.43   0.38   0.48   0.45   0.39 
total     8734   2019   2271   2131    2223 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Ratios are calculated as the following, children in school/children in school + children not in school. 
 
Source: 1995 Rural Household Survey. 
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 Table 9 
 Second Stage Regression Models by Mothers' Bargaining Power: 
 with Selected Coefficients on School-aged Children both in school and not in school by Age and Sex 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variable:  
ratio of household spending on education to the total household cash spending 
       total  Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
         (lowest female     (highest female 
         bargaining power)    bargaining power 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
boys aged  7-12 in school        0.1238***    0.1673***    0.1447**    0.0536        0.1347* 
boys aged  7-12 not in school      0.1917***    0.2111***    0.1861***    0.1375***     0.2375*** 
boys aged 13-15 in school        0.3313***    0.3875***    0.2970***    0.2836***     0.3415*** 
boys aged 13-15 not in school       0.1579***    0.1883***    0.0464     0.0704           0.2683*** 
boys aged 16-18 in school        0.5093***    0.5075***    0.5270***    0.4177***     0.5573*** 
boys aged 16-18 not in school       0.0662***    0.0436       0.0037        0.0015         0.1958*** 
girls aged  7-12 in school       0.2113***    0.2097***    0.1665***    0.1874***     0.2546*** 
girls aged  7-12 not in school      0.1145***    0.1774***    0.1068*    0.0682        0.0774 
girls aged 13-15 in school       0.3598***    0.3308***    0.3165***    0.3042***     0.4493*** 
girls aged 13-15 not in school      0.1198***    0.1321*    0.0725        0.2433***       0.0721 
girls aged 16-18 in school       0.5249***    0.5091***    0.5097***    0.5164***       0.5372*** 
girls aged 16-18 not in school      0.0132     0.0137      -0.0015    -0.0354     0.0351 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
adjusted R2         0.2821      0.3305       0.2638       0.2400        0.2822 
F-values        65.120    21.140      15.620    13.883     17.018 
dependent means         0.0944     0.0852        0.0954    0.0902        0.1069 
number of observations    7997  1999  1999  1999   1997 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: (1)  For brevity, we only report the coefficients on variables for proportions of school-aged groups. Other independent variables included in these models but not reported 
in the table are those referred to Table 3.  
(2) *** denotes statistics significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
(3) Source: 1995 Rural Household Survey.  
  
 
26 
 26 
       
 Appendix Table 1 
 OLS Regression Model to Predict Household Annual Income 
___________________________________________________________________________-
__________________ 
dependent variable= household annual income per capita in actual term  
 
independent variable:   coefficient  T-ratio 
___________________________________________________________________________________________
__ 
intercept      6171.4877  44.2 *** 
no. of HH members    -318.3909  14.0 *** 
farming land (in mu)         17.8182   3.3 ** 
household located in plain area      - 
household located in mountainous area  -870.5935  10.5 *** 
household located in hilly area   -361.7688   5.1 *** 
province:  
Beijing        321.3933   1.2  
Hebei     -2587.8579  16.5 *** 
Shangxi      -3057.3012   16.4 *** 
Liaoning     -2486.2777  13.5 *** 
Jilin     -2394.5021  12.5 *** 
Jiangsu            -    - 
Zhejian      -985.9064   5.9 *** 
Anhui     -2620.5612  16.2 *** 
Jiangxi     -2432.5391  13.7 *** 
Shangdong    -1845.8708  12.8 *** 
Henan     -2773.7275  19.2 *** 
Hubei     -2529.2943  15.2 *** 
Hunan     -2693.6845  16.7 *** 
Guangdong      269.2576   1.7 
Sichuan     -2918.2638  19.2 *** 
Gueizhou    -2261.9363  11.5 *** 
Yunnan     -2627.4369  14.1 *** 
Shaanxi     -2974.0192  16.3 *** 
Gansu     -2959.7061  15.3 *** 
 
adj R2         0.1857 
F-value           83.891 
dep mean      2467.18 
no. of observations    7998 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The omitted dummies in this model are household located in the plain area and Jiangsu province.  
 *** denotes the significance level at 1% and below,  and ** at 2%. 
 
Source: 1995 Rural Household Survey. 
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 Appendix Table 2 
 
 Main Characteristics of Household Heads by Gender 
 1995 Rural Household Survey 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable        male    female  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. household head: 
average age (in year)      43.93   46.54 
marital status (%): 
married        97.1   81.2 
widow(er)        1.6   16.0 
not in the marriage       1.3    2.8 
communist party membership     14.7   11.8 
production status (%): 
in agricultural work      79.4   70.8 
in off-farm work       14.8   11.5 
house work        1.3   12.7 
other         4.5    5.0 
educational level (%): 
high school and above      14.5   12.4 
middle school       42.1   33.1 
6 year primary school      32.0   25.6 
3 year primary school       5.7    8.4 
no education        5.4   20.5 
smokes        79.8    9.4 
2. household type (%): 
one generation household       4.0    6.3 
two generation household      73.3   67.1 
three generation household      22.1   24.7 
other HH type         0.6    1.8 
 
mean HH assets  
(current price in yuan)       703.63      466.74 
mean HH savings (in yuan)      4698.72    5942.21 
mean value of house owned     9532.05   12213.42 
(original price in yuan) 
mean debts (in yuan)          605.31     673.50 
household income per capita      2431.99   3280.75 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
no of observations      7666    332 
% of households         95.9      4.1 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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